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FEDERAL INCOME TAX-CASUALTY LOSS DEDUCTION-Determining the Proper Basis Figure in a Partial
Casualty Loss to a Timber Tract-What is the Single, Identifiable Property Damaged or Destroyed, the Trees or the
Entire Tract?
Taxpayers, Fred and Irene Rosenthal and others, were participants
in the Namarib Company-Timber Venture, a joint venture which owned
a timber tract in the state of Tennessee. On January 1, 1960, this
tract consisted of 24,605.6 acres. The venture's adjusted basis' in the
land was $11,080.93 and its adjusted basis in the timber was
$212,476.30.2 The total amount of saw timer 3 on the tract at this
time was estimated, for purposes of determining the venture's depletion deduction, 4 to be 58,445,000 board feet.5
On March 2, 1960, an ice storm struck the tract, damaging the
timber on it. There was no dispute that the fair market value of the
entire timber tract immediately preceding the storm exceeded the fair
market value of the tract immediately thereafter by at least $130,000.
The taxpayers computed this loss, for which they had received no
compensation, by insurance or otherwise, as follows:
1. destructionof 4,757,200 boardfeet of "saw timber"
(timber from trees more than 8 inches in diameter
at breast height) having a fair market value of __$104,787.29
2. destructionof 5,058.3 cords of "pulpwood"
(timber from trees between 4 and 8 inches in
diameter at breast height) having a market value of
11,643.09
3. destructionof naturally produced "young growth"
(trees measuring less than 4 inches in diameter at
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1011 (hereinafter referred to by section number
only). The adjusted basis is the basis provided in Section 1012 which states that the
basis of the property shall be the cost of such property adjusted as provided in Section
1016.
2. Treas. Reg. §1.611-3(c), and (d)(3) (1960), which require an allocation of the basis between the land and the timber.
3. Timber from trees more than 8 inches in diameter at breast height and
measured in "board feet."
4. Section 611 allows as a deduction in computing the taxable income of a
timber owner "a reasonable allowance for depletion." Section 612 provides that the
basis for depletion of property, such as timber, is the adjusted basis of such property
(i.e., its cost). This allowance is deductible from the taxpayer's gross income for the
year and is then subtracted from the adjusted basis of the tract. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3 (b)
(1960).
5. Treas. Reg. §1.6113(e) (1960), each taxpayer claiming a deduction for depletion is required to estimate the number of units of timber reasonably known at the
date of acquisition of the property.
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breast height) having a market value of
4.

12,173.00

destructionof "plantations"

(trees less than 3 feet in height, planted by the
taxpayer) having a market value of

-...........

1,906.00
$130,509.38

On its 1960 partnership information return, the venture claimed
$130,500.381 as a Section 165 casualty loss, and each taxpayer took
his appropriate percentage of this amount as a deduction on his individual income tax return. 7 The Commissioner allowed the $1,906
claimed as damage to the plantations, but he disallowed all but
$17,315 of the remaining amount claimed as a casualty loss. The

Commissioner computed the $17,315 deduction by estimating the number of board feet of merchantable timber which were contained in this
tract at the beginning of the taxable year, and then dividing the adjusted basis of the entire tract of timber by the number of board feet of
merchantable timber." The quotient produced is called the cost depletion unit, which the Commissioner contended was the basis that
should be used in determining the amount of the casualty loss deduction. This basis per unit of merchantable timber multiplied by the
number of units destroyed would then produce the maximum amount
deductible under the casualty loss provisions.'
The tax court agreed with the Commissioner's finding of a deficiency in the taxpayers' returns. 10 Ov appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, the decision of the tax court was affirmed." The court held:
2
1. The individual trees were the "single, identifiable property"'
6. By the taxpayers' own figures the decrease in the fair market value of the
timber tract was computed to be $130,509.38, but it is unexplained why the taxpayers
only claimed a deduction of $130,500.38, leaving $9.00 unaccounted for. The difference
is probably just a transposition error in the original published opinion in one of the
first two numbers, so that $130,500.38 is the correct total.
7. Treas. Reg. §1-165-7(b)(1) (1964), also see INT. REV. CODE of 1954-§§701
et. seq. concerning taxation of partnership income.
8. Treas. Reg. §1.611-3(b)(2) (1960).
9. Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(I) (1964) provides that the amount deductible for
purposes, of § 165 (a) shall be the lesser of either:
1. The amount which is equal to the fair market value of the property immediately before the casualty reduced by the fair market value of the property
immediately after the casualty; or
2. The amount of the adjusted basis prescribed in §1.1011-1 for determining
the loss from the sale or other disposition of the property involved.
However, if the property used in a trade or business or held for the production of income
is totally destroyed by casualty, and if the fair market value of such property immediately before the casualty is less than the adjusted basis of such property, the
amount of the adjusted basis of such property shall be treated as the amount of the
loss for purposes of §165(a).
10. Fred Rosenthal et. al., 48 T.C. 515 (1967).
11. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1969).
12. Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(2) (1964) states that a loss incurred in a trade or
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contemplated by the Code and the regulations, not the entire
tract of timber.
2.

The taxpayers had an allocated cost basis in their tract for the
determination of the depletion allowance"8 for partial sales of
timber, and that same allocation of basis should be applied in
the case of partial, involuntary conversions.

3.

The loss should be limited to the adjusted basis of the timber
actually destroyed, as measured in units of merchantable timber. 4

Judge Moore dissented, agreeing with the amici curiae' 5 that the
"property," for purposes of determining the amount of the casualty
loss, is the entire timber tract that the taxpayers purchased and not
units of merchantable timber. He reasoned that the "single, identifiable property" should be the tract of timber, which is a living growing
business unit, damage to which is not analogous to a voluntary sale of
merchantable timber.
Obviously, the allowable casualty loss deduction will vary greatly,
depending upon the interpretation given the phrase "single, identifiable
property damaged or destroyed." Rosenthal v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 6 presented this issue squarely, and because of the considerable impact which an adverse decision could have on the entire
timber industry", five representatives of the timber industry joined in
an amicus brief. Also at issue in Rosenthal was whether a casualty
loss may be compared to a partial sale of timber in assigning a basis to
the "property". Because of the Commissioner's stand on these two
issues, a final question of discriminatory treatment of timber owners
under the casualty loss provisions of the Internal Revenue Code was
also raised.
business or any transaction entered into for profit shall be determined by reference to
the "single, identifiable property."
13. See note 4, supra.

14.

Merchantable timber is measured in terms of "board feet"; only "saw timber,"

which is 8 inches in diameter at breast height is mature enough to be measured in
terms of "board feet" and sold.
15. The American Paper Institute, the Continental Can Company, the International paper Company, the Mead Corporation, and the West Virginia Pulp and Paper
Company filed a brief as amici curiae. All the amici are representatives of interests
owning substantial tracts of timber.
16. 416 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1969).
17. Not only timber owners are adversely affected by this decision, but many
timber related industries such as the building industry, paper industry, etc. This
decision may also affect the public interest in having a sufficient supply of this natural
resource economically available by making the business risks of this industry inhibitive
to future growth.
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THE SINGLE, IDENTIFIABLE PROPERTY ISSUE

The essential issue that the Second Circuit had to determine in
Rosenthal was the proper basis figure to be used in computing the
amount of the casualty loss deduction. Before this question could be
answered, however, the court had to interpret the phrase "single, identifiable property damaged or destroyed,"'18 which the regulations refer
to as the property whose basis is to be used in determining the loss
deduction.
Section 165(a) 19 of the Internal Revenue Code (1954) permits a
deduction for a casualty loss sustained during the taxable year and
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. Section 165(b)20
limits this deduction to no more than the basis of the property destroyed
or damaged. Section 165 (b) further states that this basis is the adjusted
basis provided in Section 101121 for determining the loss from the
sale or other disposition of property. Section 1011, in turn, refers to
Section 1012,22 which defines the basis as the "cost" of the "property"
adjusted as provided in Section 1016.23 But the regulations and Section 1012 are inconclusive, for neither defines the term "property."
The casualty loss regulations provide only that the loss incurred is to
be determined by reference to the "single identifiable property damaged
or destroyed." 2 4
The taxpayers argued that the "property" referred to in each of
these Code sections is the unit of property that they originally purchased, the entire tract of timber. The Commissioner, however, argued
that the "single, identifiable property" is each individual merchantable
tree that was damaged or destroyed.
In determining the "single, identifiable property," according to the
18. Treas. Reg. §l.165-7(b)(2)(i) (1964).
A loss incurred in a trade or business
or in any transaction entered into for profit shall be determined . . . by reference to
the single, identifiable property damaged or destroyed.
19. Section 165(a) General Rule-There shall be allowed as a deduction any
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
20. Section 165(b) Amount of the Deduction-For purposes of subsection (a),
the basis for determining the amount of the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other
dispositon of property.
21. Section 1011 provides that the adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss
from the sale or other disposition of property, whenever acquired, shall be the basis
(determined under section 1012 or other applicable sections of this subchapter and subchapters, C, K, and P) adjusted as provided in section 1016.
22. Section 1012, the basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter and subchapters C, K, and P.
23. Treas. Reg. §1.1016 (1957) provides the method of making adjustments to
basis.
24. Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(2)(i) (1964). See note 18, supra.
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regulations, the taxpayer must first determine the amount of the loss
to each separate identifiable part of the property affected. 25 In other
words, the timber tract becomes two separate identifiable pieces of
property for the purpose of determining the allowable casualty loss
deduction. The nondepreciable land is one such "property" and the
depletable trees growing on the land is considered another separate
"property."
This allocation of cost basis between depreciable and nondepreciable
property for the purpose of determining casualty losses was first used in
United States v. Koshland.2 6 There the taxpayer owned a hotel which
was totally destroyed by fire. At the time of the fire the hotel building
had been fully depreciated. The court held that the deduction for the
casualty loss was limited to the adjusted basis of the hotel building
apart from the land. For, if the property were aggregated, the taxpayer
would be able to use the basis of the nondepreciable land to increase his
allowable loss on the fully depreciated hotel building. This same prin27
ciple was also applied in Carloate Industries Inc. v. United States,
in the case of a casualty loss to a citrus grove. The basis of the property was allocated between the depreciable fruit trees and the nondepreciable land in calculating the deduction for the loss. Finally, with
regard to the timber industry itself, the principle is used to determine
the amount of a casualty loss deduction by allocating the cost basis
of the timber tract between the land and the depletable timber growing
thereon.2 Based on these cases and the regulations, both the Commissioner and the taxpayers agreed that the timber tract became at least
two separate "single, identifiable properties" for purposes of determining the casualty loss. 29 The taxpayers stopped at this point and maintained that the "single, identifiable property" was the partially damaged
timber tract.
The Commissioner and the majority admitted that the 24,605.6
acres were operated as a single tract, and were managed and depleted
as an operating unit. However, the Commissioner argued that in
ascertaining the "single, identifiable property" damaged, one must apply the allocated cost principle to the timber tract itself in order to
25.

Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(2) (1964).

26. 208 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953).
27.

28.

354 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1966).

See Estate of Sam E. Boardhead, 25 CCH T.C.M. 133, 155 (1966), ajj'd on

other grounds, 391 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1968). See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(3),
Ex. 2 (1964)
dealing with partial loss to ornamental trees; Rev. Rul. 68-531, I.R.B.
10

1968-41, p.

(partial loss to citrus grove); Internal Revenue Service Publication 225,

FARMERS TAX GUIDE, p. 50 (1968 ed.) (partial loss to orchard).

29.
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separate the damaged from the undamaged timber and produce the adjusted basis of each individual damaged tree. Furthermore, the Commissioner did not stop in his analysis with the individual tree, but reallocated cost through a narrower definition of "property." He asserted that each tree has its own adjusted basis, measured in board
feet, and that the "single identifiable property" referred to in the
casualty loss regulations is a "board foot" of timber.
A board foot of timber refers to a unit of timber for the purpose
of sale. Timber which is not mature enough can not be measured
in board feet."0 Thus trees not capable of being measured in terms
of board feet, are excluded from the Commissioner's formula for determining the allowable casualty loss deduction because they have no
adjusted basis. The Commissioner's theory is that because the cost
depletion unit is used to determine the adjusted basis of the timber
when it is sold, it should also be used to determine the adjusted basis of
the timber in calculating the allowable casualty loss deduction.A
The majority rejected the view that the timber tract is an "organic
unit," an injury to which cannot be fully measured by estimating the
number of board feet of merchantible timber destroyed. Thus it refuses
to recognize any difference between a tract of growing timber and an
inventory of cut timber in a lumber yard. The amici argued that a
timber tract is a living, growing business unit 2 whose value depends
primarily on its ability to produce marketable timber over a long
period of time without interruption or diminution. 3 Random damage
to the tract caused by a casualty loss decreases the value of the entire
tract. Intangible damage, such as a decrease in the density of the tract
due to the random destruction, increases the hazards of fire, insect
damage, disease and further storm damage.34 In fact, it is possible
for a casualty loss which destroys less than all the timber to make the
tract worthless for logging purposes 35 since there is a minimum density
below which it is not profitable to log the tract at all. 6 The decreased
30.

Brief for Amici Curiae at 36, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491 (2d

Cir. 1969).
31. Brief for the Commissioner at 15, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1969).
32. See Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-517, 16 U.S.C.
§§528-31. See generally R. HAWLEY AND D. SMITH, THE PRACTICE OF SILVICULTURE
(6th ed. 1954).
33. See, e.g., H. CHAPMAN AND W. WEYER, FOREST VALUATION 305-307 (1947).
34. Brief for Amici Curiae at 35, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1969).
35. See Note, Taxpayer's Basis For Limiting Casualty Loss Deduction For
Damage To Part Of Timber Tract Is Equal To Depletion Allowance For Trees
Damaged And Not To Basis For Entire Tract, 83 HARV. L. REV. 478, 481 (1969).
36. See L. MINKLER & J. HOSNER, How To FARM YOUR FOREST 15 (U.S. Dept.
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density of the tract affects the value of the remaining undamaged timber
because of the higher costs of removing such timber."s In the instant
case some portions of the tract in question had to be "clear cut" and
replanted. The loss of young growth is of great significance to the
present and future value of the tract, both as an organic unit and as a
business unit. All these elements reduce the value of the timber
tract, yet the Commissioner's theory, which the majority accepted,
totally excluded them from any consideration.
The majority pointed out that the taxpayers failed to assign any
dollar value to the intangible damage to the entire tract caused by the
decrease in the density. Thus, they failed to carry the burden of proof
on this point. Nevertheless, the amici argued that this failure to prove
the amount of the intangible loss does not change the inherent character of the tract as a whole. The fact that it wasn't claimed does not
establish that it could not nave been.
The majority in Rosenthal relied heavily on the decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Harper v. United States."s In
Harper the taxpayer had stipulated that his loss consisted solely of a
specified number of board feet of timber destroyed. The taxpayers in
Rosenthal made no such stipulation. In fact, they submitted evidence
as to the value of both the mature and immature timber physically
destroyed. That also established that the tract as a whole had declined in value as a result of the casualty by at least $130,500. Thus,
while the Fourth Circuit may have been precluded from considering
the decline in value of the entire tract due to the decrease in density
and loss of the immature growth,3 9 the Second Circuit was not so precluded.
The majority in Rosenthal also rejected the taxpayers' hypothetical
designed to show the incongruity of the Commissioner's theory of the
case. The hypothetical involved the selective destruction of only the
young trees which were not large enough to be measured in board
of Agr., Forest Serv., Central States Forest Experiment Station: Misc. Release No. 11,
1956).
37. Brief for Amici Curiae at 35, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491 (2d

Cir. 1969).

38. 274 F. Supp. 809 (D.S.C. 1967), aIJ'd, 396 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1968).
39. See brief for Amici Curiae at 29, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1969) as follows: "In claiming damages at common law for injuries to a
timber tract, it is clear that under a properly drawn complaint damages are measured
by the difference in the value of the property before and after the damage. However,

evidence as to the value of the timber injured or destroyed is always admissible in

determining the diminution in the value of the property and may, in the absence of
other evidence, establish the diminution in the value of the property." See, e.g.,

Alabama Great Southern v. Russell, 254 Ala. 701, 48 S.2d 949 (1949); Stertz v. Stewart, 74 Wisc. 160, 42 N.W. 214 (1889).
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feet. Obviously, serious loss to the entire tract would result which
would greatly impair the value of the entire tract, yet the Commissioner
would allow no loss deduction on the ground that these immature trees
had no adjusted basis for depletion."
Judge Moore and the amici
argued that the taxpayers do have a basis in the timber tract and that the
loss of immature trees, not of marketable size, can only be considered
as damage to the tract itself.41 By using the timber tract as the unit
of "property" involved in the casualty, the loss, resulting from the destruction of young growth, and the resulting detrimental affect on the
remainder of the tract due to the decrease in the tract's density, are
all taken into consideration in determining the amount of the casualty
loss deduction. The Commissioner's formula simply eliminates these
elements of economic loss from the allowable deduction. This result
forces the timber owners to bear the decrease in value of their property
without any effective tax relief. Judge Moore continually suggested
that this result is contrary to the express intent of Congress to allow
full deductions for uncompensated losses.4"
In determining what the "single, identifiable property" is, it must
be pointed out that nowhere in the Code or regulations does it state that
each tree has its own adjusted basis. Also, nowhere in the depletion
regulations does one find support for the Commissioner's contention
that each tree has a basis for depletion or that each board foot of timber
has a basis for depletion. A timber tract, as the amici argued, is more
aptly described by the phrase "single, identifiable property." For such
a tract of timber, managed and depleted as an operating business
unit is both "single" and "identifiable." It is also significant to note
that the depletion regulations upon which the Commissioner relies for
his theory, defines "property" in accord with the taxpayers' view as
follows:
In the case of standing timber, the depletion allowance shall be
computed solely upon the adjusted basis of the property ....
"Property" means . . . in the case of timber, an economic interest
40. Brief for Commissioner at 17, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1969).
41. Compare brief for Amici Curiae at 36, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1969) as follows: "A casualty loss is denied in the case of a growing crop
or a fully depreciated capital asset. See Reg. §1.165-6(c). In both cases the cost of
growing or acquiring the property has been fully recovered as deductions against ordinary income, and to allow a casualty loss deduction would be to allow a double deduction. With Flona Corp. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1963), appeal
dismissed by government, 62-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9489 (1964), which allowed a deduction
for a casualty loss to growing crops to the extent of basis. The allowance of a deduction
for a casualty loss which includes loss of young growth does not produce a double
deduction since no more than the cost of the tract can ever be recovered."
42. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491, 500, 504, 507, 508, 512, 513 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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in standing timber in each tract or block representing a separate
timber account §1.611-1(a)(1) (Emphasis added).
Finally, Judge Moore contended that the Commissioner's own regulations under the casualty loss provisions "not only fail to support
him, but undermine his position." The section in question is § 1.165-7
(b) (2), which concerns the method of calculating the allowable loss
deduction. It states in pertinent part:
[I]n determining the fair market value of property before and
after the casualty has occurred to a building and ornamental or
fruit trees used in a trade or business, the decrease in value shall
be measured by taking the building and trees into account separately . . . and separate losses shall be determined for such

building and trees.
As can readily be seen, the regulation itself treats all trees as the
"single, identifiable property" and it does not differentiate between
types of trees or between trees that were damaged and those that were
not.
PartialSale Analogy
After determining that the "property" involved in the casualty was
the individual trees, the Commissioner then used a partial sale analogy
in order to apply the allocated basis of salable timber to destroyed
timber. The Commissioner contended that §165(b) makes the adjusted basis for a casualty loss the same as the adjusted basis for a sale
or other disposition as provided in § 1011 and the casualty loss must
be treated as a pro tanto sale of the estimated number of merchantable
timber units destroyed.4" The amici, however, argued that the timber
tract itself had a basis for sale, 44 and that, therefore, the Commissioner's analogy could just as easily have been applied to the entire
tract of timber.
The difference between the cutting of timber for purposes of sale and
the destruction of timber as result of a casualty loss is substantial. In
Alcoma Association Inc. v. United States," where the Commissioner
applied the partial sale analogy to a citrus grove damaged by a hurricane, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the difference
as follows:
A partial sale indicates that there is at least an economic divisi43. See Harper v. United States, supra note 38, at 811 as follows: To apply
"adjusted basis" one way in calculating a gain or loss and depletion and another in
fixing the allowable deduction for casualty loss would be illogical, and violative of the
established canons of statutory construction."

44. Brief for Amici Curiae at 33, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1969).
45. 239 F.2d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 1956).
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bility of the property, and it seems reasonable to apportion the
basis of the property to what is kept and what is disposed of. A
partial casualty loss indicates no such divisibility for frequently
the entire damage must be restored before the whole is to have
any productive value. Furthermore a sale is generally voluntary
and endows the seller with assets roughly equivalent to the value
of the part sold, which he may productively reinvest after the payment of some taxes; an uninsured loss yields no such 4assets-rather
6
there is a need to obtain funds to restore the property.
In a partial sale of timber, the cost depletion allowance 47 serves the
same function as does the basis figure in a sale of nondepletable goods.
The Commissioner argued that the taxpayers' allocated basis for depletion ought to determine the limit on his deduction for a casualty
loss to the timber. This view, however, fails to recognize the fact that
a casualty loss of a certain number of merchantable trees may reduce
the value of the entire tract by more than a partial sale of an equal
number of trees.4
When timber is sold, it is sold in units of board
feet and a depletion deduction is allowed. The Commissioner contended that this depletion deduction represents the allocated cost basis
and that, therefore, it should be the limit of the allowable casualty loss
deduction. Section 1011 provides for an "adjusted basis" which sets
the maximum limitation on the casualty loss deduction allowed under
§165(b). The Commissioner's argument is that because "adjusted
basis for depletion" referred to in §631(a) and defined in Regulation
§1.631-1(d) is the equivalent of the "adjusted basis" of §1011, and
the "adjusted basis for depletion" is the equivalent of the depletion deduction allowed under §611, the §1011 adjusted basis and §611 depletion deduction are equivalents. Accordingly, the depletion deduction would establish the maximum limitation on the casualty loss deduction.
Judge Moore, agreeing with the amici, believed that the Commissioner had erroneously interpreted the phrase "adjusted basis for
depletion".4 9 Section 631(a) is the only place in the Code where this
46. See 83 HARV. L. REV. 478, 481, supra note 35.
47. Depletion is the process of using up capital assets during the normal business
operations. For tax purposes, cost depletion is an allowance from income, which represents the exhaustion of such capital assets. Depreciation is essentially the same
process. Depreciation signifies the consuming of capital assets and for tax purposes it
is an allowance from income for wear and tear to such assets.
48. See 83 HARV. L, REV. 478, 481, supra note 35.
49. Brief for Amici Curiae at 24, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1969) as follows: "For convenience of reference this amount is referred to
as the "basis for depletion", but it is clear from the context of the Code and regulations
that the phrase is not meant to define the basis of timber for any purpose. Certainly
Congress expressed no intention, and had no intention, of changing the application to
timber of the casualty loss deduction provisions of the CODE when, in 1943, it enacted
the predecessor provisions of section 631 (a)."
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phrase occurs, and there is no reference in §631(a) to the "adjusted
basis" in §165(b). There also is no reference in § 1011 or in §165(b)
to any depletion provisions.
The amici argued that the Commissioner was confusing "basis for
depletion with the "depletion unit". 0 All agree that the "basis for
depletion" is the adjusted basis of the property. However, the "depletion unit" is used to calculate the annual allowance for depletion and
not for computing leases under § 165(b). Consequently, the amici
could not agree that there is no significant different between the two
terms. In addition to a lack of statutory justification for equating
"depletion unit" with adjusted basis, the amici contended that the practical effect of using the depletion unit to limit casualty loss deductions
is to arbitrarily eliminate much of the actual economic loss from the
allowable deduction.
It is by no means clear that a taxpayer's allocation of basis for depletion purposes ought to determine the limit on his deduction for a
casualty loss. The Board of Tax Appeals rejected the use of depletion
provisions to determine the allowable casualty loss deduction in Lock,
Moore & Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner,5' where it said:
[D]epletion signifies the process of using up a capital asset in the
production of goods and the provisions of law governing depletion
allowances do not extend to the determination of deductible losses
on account of storms, fire, or other casualty. . . . It is the normal
shrinkage of timber due to its use that the depletion allowance
of the statute is designed to take care of and not the extraordinary
losses due to casualty.
Judge Moore argued that there was no legislative history offered or
found which would justify the use of cost depletion in casualty loss
situations. Neither the casualty loss provisions nor the depletion provisions refer to each other. Additionally, the definition of "property"
in the regulations which is applicable to timber owners is found in the
depletion provisions, and it indicates that the entire timber tract is the
"property" considered for purposes of the depletion provisions. Judge
Moore thus concluded that the majority had erred in looking solely
to the "depletion unit" to limit the allowable casualty loss deduction
instead of focusing on the property the taxpayers actually purchased,
the entire tract of timber.

50. Brief for Amid Curiae at 20, 21, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1969).
51. 7 B.T.A. 1008, 1011 (1927).
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PERCENTAGE-OF-BASIS FORMULA

Another serious question is raised by the Commissioner's use of the
partial sale analogy. In the dissenting view of Judge Moore, this analogy is simply a device for achieving the same result as the percentageof-basis formula, which has been held to deny the full casualty loss
deduction that Congress intended. Under the old percentage-of-basis
formula, the amount allowable as a deduction was limited to a percentage of the taxpayer's basis. This percentage was equal to the ratio
between the decrease in value after the casualty and the value of the
property immediately before the casualty.5 2 The amici contended that
the Commissioner's formula allows for only a fraction of the loss actually sustained" to timber properties only, and in direct conflict with
the mandate of the regulations.
The use of the percentage-of-basis rule by the Commissioner in
limiting casualty loss deductions was rejected by the Supreme Court
and the full deduction approach was ratified instead. The Court's
decision in Helvering v. Owens,54 involving non-business property, explicitly determined that the allowable casualty loss was to be the actual
decrease in the market value immediately before and immediately after
the casualty, but limited to the total adjusted basis of the property.
The Court's decision also weakened the validity of the partial sale
analogy, which is the essence of the percentage-of-basis formula.
Later, in Alcoma Associations Inc. v. United States55 the percentageof-basis formula was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in relation to a partial
casualty loss to business property.5 6 The taxpayer in Alcoma claimed
a deduction because of hurricane damage to his citrus grove. The
hurricane had caused a decrease in the value of the grove by $191,500,
which was 12.18% of the $1,571,575 value of the grove before the
casualty. The adjusted basis of the property before the casualty was
$523,000. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for the full amount of
the loss of $191,500. The Commissioner used the percentage-of-basis
formula, which allowed only 12.18% of the adjudged basis of $523,000
or $63,700 as a deduction. The Fifth Circuit held that the percentage52. Percentage-of-basis formula:
Amount Deductible
as a casualty loss
=

Adjusted
Basis

X

Decrease in
Value due to casualty
Value Before

Casualty
53. Whitaker, Timber Casualties,26 ALA. LAWYER 233, 240 (1965).
54. 305 U.S. 468 (1939).
55. 239 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1956).
56. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
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of-basis rule and the partial sale analogy are inconsistent with the
Supreme Court decision in Owens and also with the congressional policy
of allowing a deduction for the full amount of the uncompensated loss.
The court further stated that the Commissioner's formula limiting the
allowable loss in the case of partial destruction of business property
to a fraction of the adjusted basis, rather than the full amount of the
adjudicated basis, was not directly supported by pertinent statutory provisions.
In response to the decision in Alcoma, the Commissioner adopted a
new regulation, which became §1.165(b)(1) of the regulations. This
provision incorporated the Owens and Alcoma decisions into the casualty loss provisions.
In Rosenthal, the Commissioner determined the casualty loss deduction by multiplying the depletion unit by the estimated number of
board feet of timber destroyed. The depletion unit had been computed
by dividing the estimated amount of saw timber on the tract before the
storm into the adjusted basis of the timber tract in 1960. The deduction produced by this method was $17,315.
Judge Moore, agreed with the amici that if the percentage-of-basis
formula were applied to the taxpayers' timber tract instead of the
Commissioner's formula, the mathematical result would be substantially
the same.e5 Under the percentage-of-basis formula, the ratio of the
casualty loss to the value of the property immediately before the casualty multiplied by the basis of the property produces the allowable deduction.s
57.

Commissioner's Formula

Adjusted Basis
= Depletion
X Itimber
=
Casualty Loss
Total Timber
Unit
)estroyed
Deduction
(board feet)
board feet)
$212,476
= $3.64
X 4,757,000
=
$17,315
58,445,000
1000
board feet
board feet
board feet
Percentage-of-BasisFormula
Decrease in Value
due to Casualty
X
Adjusted
-Amount Deductible
Value before
Basis
as a Casualty Loss
Casualty
Timber Destroyed
(board feet)
X
Adjusted
-Amount Deductible
Total Timber before
Basis
as a Casualty Loss
Casualty (board feet)
4,757,000 board feet
X
Adjusted
-$17,315
58,445,000 board feet
Basis
58. Because the value of the tract before the storm is not available from the record,
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Evidently the formula applied by the Commissioner in the present
case will produce basically the same result that was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Owens, and by the Fifth Circuit in Alcoma. 59
The Commissioner, on the other hand, argued that the amici completely disregarded the reason for the rejection of the percentage-ofbasis rule. Arguably, the Owens and Alcoma decisions did not discredit the percentage-of-basis rule in cases of partial destruction of
property that is readily divisible, such as a tract of timber. 60 The
Fourth Circuit has in fact upheld the Commissioner's present formula
in Harper v. United States6 ' and reached the same result based on
facts similar to those in Rosenthal. In contrast, Judge Moore and the
amici believed that Harper was distinguishable on its facts,6" and because the decision was premised on the partial sale analogy. This in
turn leads to a percentage-of-basis treatment for casualty losses of
timber owners. Therefore, they argued that Harper was inconsistent
with the intent of Congress underlying the casualty loss provisions.
Discriminatory Treatment
The majority's decision in Rosenthal presents yet another point of
controversy, namely, whether or not the Commissioner's position results in discriminatory treatment of timber owners under the casualty
loss provisions of the Code. The formula makes a distinction between
damaged and undamaged trees. Section 1.165-7(b)(2) 3 on which
the Commissioner relies, however, does not make that distinction. The
Commissioner's formula also distinguished the types of damaged trees
that could be considered in determining the casualty loss deduction.
it is not possible to make the precise computation. But the use of the quantity of
timber instead of the value of the tract should produce a similar ratio and therefore
approx;mately the same answer. Any difference in the result is due to the fact that
the depletion rate is uniform for each board foot of timber even though the value of
the timber varies by the species and the accessibility, plus the losses to young growth
and the affect on the value of the remaining timber. All of these elements are not
considered in the Comm:ssioner's computations.
59. Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(1) (1964).
60. Brief for Commissioner at 19, 20, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1969).
61. 396 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1968).
62. See brief for Amici Curiae at 29, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1969), as follows: "the difference between Harper and the case at bar is that
the case at bar clearly establishes the amount of the decline in value of the entire
tract caused by the storm; whereas in Harper the evidence did not show the amount of
the decline in value and therefore, did not provide a basis satisfactory to the Court for
the allowance of a deduction for economic loss suffered."
63. Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(2)(1)
(1964). In determining the fair market value
of the property before and after the casualty has occurred to a building and ornamental
and fruit trees used in a trade or business, the decrease in value shall be measured by
taking the building and the trees into account separately . . . . and separate losses
shall be determined for such building and trees.
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Damaged trees were artificially separated into those that were mature
enough to be of marketable size, and those that were too young to be
of marketable size, allowing a deduction only for the merchantable
trees. Judge Moore pointed out that the Commissioner seemed to
recognize some merit in this point because he explicitly allowed the
$1,906 loss deduction for the value of the damaged "plantations"
which are immature growth of non-merchantable size. The $1,906 represented destruction of 10% of the tract's plantations and was permitted without differentiating between damaged and undamaged
plantations.
In Frank R. Hinman,6 4 the Commissioner did not apply the percentage-of-basis formula to a partially destroyed farm. There the taxpayer suffered a loss from flooding which rendered 58% of the
farm's 264.8 acres completely valueless. In authorizing a deduction
of their entire $12,875 basis, the court made no suggestion that the
percentage-of-basis formula was required or that the loss should be
treated as sale or other disposition of the valueless land. Similarly,
in United States v. Koshland,65 where an improvement to land which
was partially damaged by fire, the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the
full extent of his uncompensated loss limited only by his adjusted basis
in the entire improvement. More in point, the owners of shrubbery and
ornamental or fruit trees are allowed a deduction for casualty losses
to the full extent of the loss, up to the adjusted basis in all the trees.66
Thus, in Alcoma the taxpayer was permitted to deduct the full extent
of his loss within the limit of his adjusted basis in the entire citrus
67

grove.

The taxpayers in Rosenthal were not afforded this same treatment.
While the majority contended that timber is distinguishable from farm
land, shrubbery, and fruit trees because timber is cut and sold as an end
product, farm land is also divisible into parcels and salable as an end
product. Ornamental and fruit trees are also sold as end products.
The major error with this type of analysis is that a casualty loss is not
the equivalent of a sale of timber. 8 They are essentially different,
64.

12 CCH T.C.M. 1347 (1953).

65.

208 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953).

66. Treas. Reg. §1.165-7(b)(3) Ex. 2, (1964).
67. The Commissioner, in construing the casualty loss provision with respect to
orchards, has also continued to regard the orchard and not each tree in the orchard
as the "identifiable property." This can be seen from the 1967 edition of the Farmer's
Tax Guide, IRS Publication No. 225 at 49, 50. The Commissioner has also treated
hurricane damage to a citrus grove by permitting deduction for the full loss within the
limits of the adjusted basis and, therefore, without distinguishing between damaged
and undamaged trees. See Rev. Rul. 68-531, I.R.B. 1968-41, 10.
68. See 83 Hmtv. L. REv. 478, 481, note 35, supra.
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and treating them as similar disregards the congressional purpose in
the casualty loss provisions.
The majority expressed concern that to allow a full deduction for
the taxpayers' loss would give them a windfall because they would be
allowed a tax-free benefit on the appreciated value of their property.
This issue was considered by the Fifth Circuit in Alcoma, and there
the court said:
Finally the Commissioner objects that the taxpayer's formula in
effect allows him to take losses against anticipated profits from
the appreciation of his property, for which he has paid no taxes.
This argument is deceptive. The only real amount is the out-ofpocket loss suffered by the taxpayer; this loss might indeed be
larger than otherwise because of the appreciation in value and
cost of the property, but it is nevertheless a real loss. This loss can
in any event be deducted only to the extent of the original investment reduced by the previously allowed depreciation [adjusted
basis]. 69
No windfall loss deduction will arise from allowing the taxpayers in
Rosenthal to deduct the loss up to their adjusted basis in the entire
timber tract. Because the allowable deduction must then be subtracted
from their adjusted basis, they will have an accordingly lower adjusted
70
basis for purposes of future dispositions.
The casualty loss provisions are basically intended to provide compensation for uninsured losses. To timber owners these provisions are
of tremendous importance because insurance against losses to standing
timber caused by fire, ice, windstorm or other casualty is generally not
available in the United States, 71 requiring each timber owner to bear
the full brunt of such casualties. By denying tax losses in areas where
economic losses are a reality, the Commissioner has frustrated the intent
of Congress. Viewing the timber tract as the "single, identifiable
property damaged or destroyed" and using its adjusted basis as the limit
on the allowable casualty loss deduction, produces a more equitable
result which is in line with the express purpose of the casualty loss
provisions.
JoHN W. BELL

69. Alcoma Assoc. Inc. v. U.S., 239 F.2d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 1956).
70. Treas. Reg. §1.1016-1 requires the taxpayer to adjust his basis in the property
due to any loss deductions allowed to him.
71. CHAPMAN & WEYER, supra note 33, at 349-54. Also, see brief for Amici Curiae
at 32, Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1969).

